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oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/2232015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
The fairness of sanctions: some implications for optimal enforcement policy
Mitchell Polinsky, A
Shavell, S
Article
In this article we incorporate notions of the fairness of sanctions into the standard model of public enforcement. When both the probability and magnitude of sanctions may be varied, the usual solution involves a very high sanction and a relatively low probability of enforcement if individuals are risk neutral. When the issue of fairness is added to the analysis, the optimal sanction generally is not extremely high because such a sanction would be seen as unfair. The optimal probability of imposing sanctions may be higher than in the usual case (to offset the lower sanction) or lower than in the usual case (because the lower sanction reduces the effectiveness of enforcement).
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/223
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.223
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/2382015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
Dispute and its resolution: delineating the economic role of the common law
Barzel, Y
Article
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/238
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.238
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/2592015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
What do prosecutors maximize? An analysis of the federalization of drug crimes
Glaeser, EL
Kessler, DP
Morrison Piehl, A
Article
Recent legislation has expanded the jurisdiction of the federal government over crimes that were traditionally prohibited only by state law. We model the decision-making process of state and federal prosecutors, and the determinants of prosecutors' decisions to allocate drug cases to the state versus the federal systems. Using 1991 surveys of state and federal inmates incarcerated for drug crimes, we find that individuals who hire private attorneys and who are high-human-capital and successful in the legitimate sector are more likely to end up in the federal system. This is consistent with the model in which prosecutors maximize both the payoffs from eliminating crime and their private human capital.
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/259
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.259
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/2912015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
Choice of law and the home-court advantage: evidence
Thiel, SE
Article
This paper tests three separate hypotheses about inherent biases in the application of modern choice of law rules: (1) Brilmayer's 1980 hypothesis that such rules camouflage 'pro-resident, pro-forum-law, pro-recovery' biases, (2) Borchers's 1992 hypothesis that courts do not consistently apply the principles of the choice of law rule they claim to be applying, and (3) an economic hypothesis, presented in the paper, that only a 'pro-forum-law' bias is unambiguously consistent with economic efficiency, simply because it conserves the resources of the court and bar in the forum state. I find relatively strong support for the 'pro-recovery' bias of courts, weaker support for 'pro-forum-law' bias, and reject the 'pro-resident' bias. If anything, states retaining the rigid choice of law rules are more likely to favor their residents. Moreover, I reject Borchers's claim that courts do not take the modern approaches seriously. Indeed, in general, they follow Borchers's own predictions.
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/291
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.291
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/3182015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
Conditional cost shifting and the incidence of trial: pretrial bargaining in the face of a Rule 68 offer
Farmer, A
Pecorino, P
Article
Under Rule 68, a defendant may submit a pretrial offer of judgment to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff refuses this offer and later receives a smaller award at trial, the defendant's court costs subsequent to the offer are shifted to the plaintiff. We analyze Rule 68 in a game theoretic setting in which trials may result from an informational asymmetry: the defendant is the informed party, and bargaining may take place after the defendant submits an offer of judgment to the plaintiff. Rule 68 may encourage settlement through this offer of judgment by prompting partial revelation of privately held information.
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/318
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.318
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/3422015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
Games, information, and evidence production: with application to English legal history
Sanchirico, CW
Article
This paper studies the problem of how the legal system regulates activity outside the courtroom based on information supplied in court by interested and potentially dishonest parties. The supply of information is analyzed along a game-theoretic dimension: the extent to which the supplier has an interest in how the information will be used. Such analysis uncovers a basic trade-off in system design between the 'fixed costs' of hearings (e.g., the productive activity forsaken by participation) and the cost of the evidence produced therein. This trade-off helps to explain and connect several trends in the historical evolution of English civil process.
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/342
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.342
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/3812015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
An economic analysis of the use of citations in the law
Posner, RA
Article
This paper examines the use of citations analysis as an empirical tool for understanding aspects of the legal system and for improving the performance of the system. Emphasis is laid on the use of such analysis as a means to evaluate courts and judges (and therefore as a judicial-management tool), to test hypotheses about judicial behavior, and to evaluate and improve legal scholarship. It is argued that economic models, particularly of reputation and of human capital, can frame and guide the use of citations analysis in law.
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/381
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.381
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:2/2/4072015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:2:2
Review essay. The New Palgrave: surveying two waves of economic analysis of law
Edlin, AS
Article
Oxford University Press
2000-05-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/2/2/407
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/2.2.407
en
Copyright (C) 2000, American Law and Economics Association