2024-03-28T19:50:35Zhttp://open-archive.highwire.org/handler
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/12015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law
Dharmapala, Dhammika
McAdams, Richard H.
Article
We argue that legislation can generate compliance expressively, independently of deterrence. The Condorcet jury theorem implies that, in certain circumstances, the legislative process aggregates the private information of legislators to reach a decision superior to that of any individual legislator. Citizens may update their beliefs about issues the legislation addresses <it>even though individual legislators are no better informed than individual citizens</it>, and change their behavior in the direction of greater compliance. We first use a model with sincere voting and then consider strategic voting, position‐taking preferences, lobbying, and legislative institutions. We use a public smoking ban for illustration, and propose an experimental test.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/1
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.1
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/1342015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases
Daughety, Andrew F.
Reinganum, Jennifer F.
Article
We examine the effect of “split‐award” statutes (wherein the state shares a punitive damages award) on equilibrium settlements and the incentives to go to trial. Splitaward statutes lower settlement amounts and the likelihood of trial, as both parties act to cut out the state. We analyze the revenue that split‐award statutes generate; the revenue‐maximizing share is robust to variations in economic parameters and to whether the state's share is gross or net of the plaintiff's attorney's fee. Moreover, these statutes need not deter filings, and their use can encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue weaker cases than would otherwise be brought.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/134
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.134
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Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/1652015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
Polinsky, A. Mitchell
Rubinfeld, Daniel L.
Article
The potential conflict of interest between lawyers and clients is well known. If a lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the case, the lawyer may wish to bring the case even when it is not in the best interest of the client, may spend more hours working on the case than the client would want, and may reject a settlement when the client would be better off if it were accepted. Alternatively, if the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee arrangement—under which he is paid a fraction of any trial award or settlement but bears all of the cost of litigation—the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the client would be better off going to trial. In this article we propose a method of compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client. Our system is a variation of the conventional contingent fee system, but, in contrast to that system, we would have the lawyer bear only a fraction of the cost of litigation—the same fraction that the lawyer obtains of the award or settlement. We demonstrate that when the fraction of the cost that the lawyer bears equals the fraction of the award or settlement that he obtains, he will have an incentive to do exactly what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending time on the case, and settling the case. Under our modified contingent fee system, a third party would compensate the lawyer for a certain fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer would pay that party an up‐front fee. In this way, the client would not bear any costs, even if the case were lost, just as under the conventional contingent fee system.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/165
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.165
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/1892015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
Fly by Night or Face the Music? Premature Dissolution and the Desirability of Extended Liability
Boyd, James
Ingberman, Daniel E.
Article
Premature dissolution can be a rational corporate response to the threat of future liability. Although early dissolution is costly to a firm, liability may be more so. The way in which liability rules can exacerbate this extreme form of liability avoidance is of interest, since “fly‐by‐night” firms generate particularly large social costs. In particular, we explore the consequences of liability that is extended to the business partners of an insolvent or absent tortfeasor—a relatively common legal response when tortfeasors abandon obligations. Extended liability can be desirable; however, if extended liability is anticipated, business partners themselves may choose to fly by night. We show how the preferred liability rule, including no liability, depends on the relative costs of premature dissolution and future obligations. The analysis also sheds light on a set of interrelated legal issues, such as the role of the trust fund doctrine and state dissolution statutes.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/189
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.189
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/2332015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
What Determines Judicial Prestige? An Empirical Analysis for Judges of the Federal Court of Australia
Smyth, Russell
Bhattacharya, Mita
Article
This article examines judicial citations to analyze the determinants of judicial prestige in the Federal Court of Australia. First we construct two alternative measures of judicial prestige for all current and retired judges of the Federal Court. Second, we regress these measures of judicial prestige on a series of explanatory variables covering age on appointment, appointing government, prior experience, which law school the judge attended, how many law review articles the judge has published, gender, and tenure. We compare our results with those of previous studies that examine the determinants of judicial influence and prestige in courts in the United States and the High Court of Australia. One of the main contributions of the article is to provide evidence from an intermediate appellate court that can be used to test the general application of findings as to what determines judicial prestige in the United States to courts in other countries with different institutional frameworks.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/233
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.233
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/2632015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
Property Rights and the Creation of Wealth
van den Bergh, Roger
Review Essays
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/263
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.263
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/322015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
Do Publicly Traded Firms Price Differently from Private Firms?
Schargrodsky, Ernesto
Article
This article analyzes whether publicly traded firms price differently from privately held firms in the product markets. Our empirical evidence shows that, in the U.S. newspaper industry, firms increase their prices when their ownership structure changes from private to public. The effects are robust and significant. A plausible explanation is that private owners enjoy more freedom than public managers to expand circulation and distort content, pursuing the consumption of nonpecuniary benefits of control. Additional evidence is consistent with this interpretation. Public newspapers show lower prices when insiders' ownership participation is higher. Moreover, private newspapers appear more likely than public newspapers to endorse a candidate during presidential campaigns. To my knowledge there are no previous studies comparing pricing by private and public companies.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/32
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.32
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/612015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis
Wittman, Donald
Article
Do civil juries follow the broad dictates of the law? For example, do those plaintiffs who suffer greater damages receive greater awards? Are juries consistent? Do juries empty deep pockets? In many states automobile accidents are first tried by a professional arbitrator and then by a jury if one of the litigants is dissatisfied with the outcome. How do the decisions made by professional arbitrators compare to the decisions made by juries? This article seeks to answer these questions by first developing a model of arbitrator selection and then undertaking an empirical study of 380 automobile accident cases that went through both an arbitration and a jury trial.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/61
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.61
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/1/942015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:1
The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model
Eisenberg, Theodore
Farber, Henry
Article
We develop a model of the plaintiff's decision to file a lawsuit that has implications for how differences between the federal government and private litigants translate into differences in trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. Our case selection model generates a set of predictions for relative trial rates and plaintiff win rates, depending on the type of case and whether the government is defendant or plaintiff. To test the model, we use data on about 474,000 cases filed in federal district court between 1979 and 1994 in the areas of personal injury and job discrimination, in which the federal government and private parties work under roughly similar legal rules. We find broad support for the predictions of the model.
Oxford University Press
2003-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/1/94
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/5.1.94
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association