2024-03-29T14:47:08Zhttp://open-archive.highwire.org/handler
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/2712015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy
Trebilcock, Michael J.
Article
This article notes dramatic differences in growth over recent decades in the international movement of goods, services, and capital, on the one hand, and people, on the other, and also notes that there appear to be substantial potential global welfare gains from increased personal mobility, thus raising important positive and normative puzzles about the relatively restrictive nature of many countries' immigration policies. It points out that most receiving countries apply quotas to family class immigrants, independent (economic) immigrants, and offshore refugee claimants. These policies are critiqued from economic, communitarian, and liberal perspectives, and the case is developed, at least from economic and liberal perspectives, for much more liberal immigration policies. However, it recognizes that fiscally induced immigration is a legitimate concern and argues for a mandatory private market insurance regime to cover the risk of claims by immigrants against most noncontributory social programs for a minimum period of time, comparing this proposal with other mechanisms for controlling fiscally induced immigration.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/271
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg019
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/3182015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence
Katz, Lawrence
Levitt, Steven D.
Shustorovich, Ellen
Article
Previous research has attempted to identify a deterrent effect of capital punishment. We argue that the quality of life in prison is likely to have a greater impact on criminal behavior than the death penalty. Using state-level panel data covering the period 1950–90, we demonstrate that the death rate among prisoners (the best available proxy for prison conditions) is negatively correlated with crime rates, consistent with deterrence. This finding is shown to be quite robust. In contrast, there is little systematic evidence that the execution rate influences crime rates in this time period.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/318
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg014
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/3442015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data
Dezhbakhsh, Hashem
Rubin, Paul H.
Shepherd, Joanna M.
Article
Evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment is important for many states that are currently reconsidering their position on the issue. We examine the deterrent hypothesis by using county-level, postmoratorium panel data and a system of simultaneous equations. The procedure we employ overcomes common aggregation problems, eliminates the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity, and provides evidence relevant for current conditions. Our results suggest that capital punishment has a strong deterrent effect; each execution results, on average, in eighteen fewer murders—with a margin of error of plus or minus ten. Tests show that results are not driven by tougher sentencing laws and are robust to many alternative specifications.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
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http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/344
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg021
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/3772015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment
Wickelgren, Abraham L.
Article
The criminal punishment literature has focused on justifying nonmaximal punishments and the use of nonmonetary sanctions. It has not addressed why imprisonment, rather than cheaper forms of corporal punishment, should be the dominant type of nonmonetary sanctions. David Friedman (1999) recently hypothesized that, because convicts lack political influence, it is desirable to make punishment costlier than necessary to prevent policy makers from excessively punishing convicts. This article explicitly models this hypothesis and uses simulations to determine under what circumstances this hypothesis justifies using imprisonment rather than cheaper nonmonetary sanctions.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/377
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg018
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/4122015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
How Do the Laws of Probability Constrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial Profiling?
Dominitz, Jeff
Article
Faced with pending legislation and litigation, numerous jurisdictions have begun programs to monitor a range of traffic stop outcomes, focusing on variation by race or ethnicity. Existing programs, however, ignore the unequal outcomes that motivate opposition to racial profiling. Statistical relationships limit the ability of public policy to equalize the various outcomes, even if officers do not engage in racial profiling to “any extent or degree.” This article demonstrates relationships among five outcomes that are or should be considered when policy on racial profiling is formulated: search rates, find rates, thoroughness of search, rates of detention of the innocent, and rates of apprehension of the guilty. Once decisions are made as to how to balance desires for equality of each of these outcomes, problems remain that are common to statistical assessments of pattern- or practice-of-discrimination claims.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/412
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg011
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/4332015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence
Bar-Gill, Oren
Ben-Shahar, Omri
Article
This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, the validity of the efficiency justifications for the comparative negligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests that comparative negligence is the superior rule in the presence of court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flaw in this claim and conducts numerical simulations — a form of synthetic “empirical” tests — that prove the potential superiority of other rules. The second argument in the literature in favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on its alleged superior ability to deal with private information. This article develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanisms that induce self-selection among actors. It then shows that self-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence, but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusions weaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal of the “division-of-liability” principle within tort law and beyond.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/433
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg016
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/4702015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firing Costs or Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?
Schanzenbach, Max
Article
The common law doctrine of employment at will holds that, unless specified otherwise, the employment relationship can be terminated for any reason. Beginning in the mid-1970s, many state courts became willing to find exceptions to this doctrine. A possible benefit of this new approach is that it provides a third-party enforcement mechanism to implicit labor contracts. This article uses two large micro data sets on employee tenure and wages to evaluate the impact of exceptions to employment at will. Although the results suggest that exceptions to employment at will affected labor markets, there is little evidence that exceptions helped enforce implicit contracts.
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/470
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg013
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:5/2/5052015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:5:2
Volume 5 Index
Index
Oxford University Press
2003-08-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/2/505
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahg022
en
Copyright (C) 2003, American Law and Economics Association