2024-03-28T12:00:11Zhttp://open-archive.highwire.org/handler
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/3192015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from Micro Data
Mocan, H. Naci
Rees, Daniel I.
Articles
This article investigates the determinants of criminal activity among juveniles in the United States. It uses a survey of U.S. high school students conducted in 1995, which provides detailed information on offenses; personal, family, and neighborhood characteristics; as well as deterrence measures. The determinants of selling drugs and committing assault, robbery, burglary, and theft are analyzed separately for males and females. The results provide some evidence that juveniles respond to incentives and sanctions. Employment opportunities and policies designed to increase the probability of arrest may be effective tools for reducing juvenile crime.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/319
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi011
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/3502015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
Deterrence and Origin of Legal System: Evidence from 1950-1999
Smith, Michael L.
Articles
This article offers evidence on legal systems’ detterrence of acts that may cause harm, which extends law‐and‐finance literature comparing common law and civil code systems. Fatality rates from two causes are used to gauge deterrence: (1) motor vehicle accidents and (2) accidents other than motor vehicle. Both vary significantly across countries classified by origin of legal system. The data cover 50 years, offering evidence on evolution of differences over time. Findings for accidents other than motor vehicle are evidence on legal system flexibility, as the diffuse set of causes increases the difficulty of specifying harmful actions ex ante.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/350
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi015
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/3792015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys
Boylan, Richard T.
Articles
This study examines the performance of chief federal prosecutors (U.S. attorneys) and their subsequent careers. In a sample of 570 attorneys in office from 1969 to 2000, the length of prison sentences is positively related to subsequent favorable career outcomes for U.S. attorneys. In contrast, conviction rates do not appear to affect the careers of U.S. attorneys. These results are consistent with longer total prison sentences’ being personally beneficial to prosecutors, and prosecutors’ maximizing the length of prison sentences. Overall, the results suggest that sentence length, as opposed to convictions rates, is the relevant performance metric.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/379
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi016
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/4032015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy
Ayotte, Kenneth
Listokin, Yair
Articles
Many firms have filed for bankruptcy to manage mass tort liabilities, most notably asbestos producers. We model a bankruptcy procedure that optimally balances the liquidity needs of present claimants and an uncertain number of future claimants. We find that future claimants should receive greater awards in expectation than present claimants as compensation for bearing greater future claims risk. We also find that allocating more value to contractual creditors in bankruptcy makes an earlier filing more likely, which may increase overall welfare. Optimal risk-sharing implies that creditors should receive equity in a trust fund, with tort claimants receiving senior debtlike securities.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/403
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi012
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/4392015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
Limited Liability in California 1928-31: It's the Lawyers
Weinstein, Mark I.
Articles
Only in 1931 was the California Corporate Code revised to provide for limited liability. In earlier work I found that this move had no detectable effect on shareholder wealth. In this article I examine the potential beneficiaries of this change with an eye toward finding out who wanted this change. Using this historical example we can shed light on a number of issues including: (1) the economic impact of limited liability; (2) the role of lawyers, especially lawyers of high prestige, in determining the law; and (3) the competition or lack thereof among states in designing their corporate codes.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/439
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi013
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/4842015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in Private Law
Ben-Shahar, Omri
Mikos, Robert A.
Articles
Parties who make investments that generate externalities may sometimes recover from the beneficiaries, even in the absence of contract. Previous scholarship has shown that granting recovery, based on either the cost of reasonable investment or the benefit conferred, can provide optimal incentives to invest. This article demonstrates that the law often awards recovery that is neither purely cost-based nor purely benefit-based and instead equals either the greater or lesser of the two measures. These hybrid approaches to recovery distort compensation and incentives. The article demonstrates the surprising prevalence of these practices and explores informational and institutional reasons why they emerge.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/484
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi014
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:7/2/5232015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:7:2
The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered
Feldman, Allan M.
Kim, Jeonghyun
Articles
Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in <it>United States v. Carroll Towing Co</it>. (1947) is canonized in the law-and-economics literature as the first use of cost-benefit analysis for determining negligence and assigning liability. This article revisits the case in which the Hand formula was born and examines whether Judge Hand’s ruling in that case would provide correct incentives for efficient levels of precaution. We argue that the negligence test as used by Judge Hand is somewhat different from the Hand test as used by modern law-and-economics theorists. With a game theoretic analysis of the case, we show that Judge Hand’s negligence test could in fact produce games with inefficient equilibria, or with liability determinations opposite Judge Hand’s.
Oxford University Press
2005-09-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/7/2/523
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi017
en
Copyright (C) 2005, American Law and Economics Association