2024-03-28T21:16:21Zhttp://open-archive.highwire.org/handler
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/12015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
Corporation and Contract
Hansmann, Henry
Articles
Publicly traded corporations rarely use the nearly absolute freedom afforded them to draft charters that deviate from the default terms of state corporation law. Conventional explanations for this phenomenon are unconvincing. A more promising explanation lies in the lack of any feasible amendment mechanism that will assure efficient adaptation of charter terms as changing circumstances dictate during the long expected lifetime of a public corporation. In effect, by adopting state law default terms, corporations delegate to the state the process of amending charter provisions over time.
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/1
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj007
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/1162015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment
Kuziemko, Ilyana
Articles
This article investigates whether the death penalty encourages defendants charged with potentially capital crimes to plead guilty in exchange for lesser sentences. I exploit a natural experiment in New York State: the 1995 reinstatement of capital punishment, coupled with the public refusal of some prosecutors to pursue death sentences (N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 [McKinney 1975]). Using individual-level data on all felony arrests in the state between 1985 and 1998, I find the death penalty leads defendants to accept plea bargains with harsher terms, but does not increase defendants’ overall propensity to plead guilty. A differences-in-differences analysis of a national cross-section of homicide defendants confirms these results.
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/116
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj005
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/1432015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869-2002
Yoon, Albert
Articles
When Article III judges conclude active service, they effectively abdicate their seat and enable the president and Senate to select a successor. Some judicial scholars have concluded that political factors—both within and across institutions—largely influence this decision. Analyzing judicial turnover, year by year, this article finds that judges have increasingly synchronized their departure from active service with qualifying for their judicial pension. By comparison, political and institutional factors appear to have little influence on turnover rates. These findings contradict much of the existing scholarship on judicial turnover and also offer more viable alternatives for judicial reform.
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/143
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj003
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/202015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees
Emons, Winand
Articles
Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgment; under conditional fees he gets an upscale premium if the case is won, a premium unrelated, however, to the adjudicated amount. This article compares conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers choose between a safe and a risky litigation strategy. Under conditional fees lawyers prefer the safe strategy; under contingent fess, the risky one. Risk-averse plaintiffs prefer conditional fees over contingent fees when lawyering costs are low and vice-versa for high lawyering costs.
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/20
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj002
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/332015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution
Hylton, Keith N.
Articles
It is common in the legal academy to describe judicial decision trends leading to new common law rules as resulting from conscious judicial effort. Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by litigants. One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could occur. This article presents a model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the part of judges. Trends can develop favoring the better-informed litigant whose case is also meritorious. Although the model does not suggest an unambiguous trend toward efficient legal rules, it does show how private information from litigants becomes embodied in common law, an important part of the theory of efficient legal rules.
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/33
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj001
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/622015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
Statistics of Legal Infrastructures: A Review of the Law and Finance Literature
Georgakopoulos, Nicholas L.
Articles
Two books on law and development and the law-and-finance literature have produced a major opening for the field of international statistical comparisons of legal systems. This review provides some background from microstructure to help the understanding of the effects the statistical comparisons demonstrate and points out opportunities for further research.
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/62
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj004
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association
oai:open-archive.highwire.org:aler:8/1/812015-05-20HighWireOUPaler:8:1
The Duel of Honor: Screening For Unobservable Social Capital
Allen, Douglas W.
Reed, Clyde G.
Articles
The duel of honor was a highly ritualized violent activity practiced (mostly) by aristocrats from about 1500 to 1900. The duel of honor was held in private, was attended by seconds and other members of society, was illegal, and often resulted from trivial incidents. Duels were fought according to strict codes, their lethality fell over time, and certain members of society were not allowed to duel. We argue dueling functioned as a screen for unobservable investments in social capital. Social capital was used during this period to support political transactions in an age when high civil service appointments were made through patronage. The screening hypothesis explains the puzzling features of the duel of honor, its rise and fall over time and locations, and the differences between European and American duels. In a state of highly polished society, an affront is held to be a serious injury. It must, therefore, be resented, or rather a duel must be fought upon it; as men have agreed to banish from their society one who puts up with an affront without fighting a duel. <qd> —Samuel Johnson, quoted in James Boswell </qd>
Oxford University Press
2006-03-01 00:00:00.0
TEXT
text/html
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/8/1/81
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahj006
en
Copyright (C) 2006, American Law and Economics Association